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CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

t

POPE PIUS XII

T

HE QUESTION which We shall examine today was suggested to Us by
one of you, the illustrious Professor Carnelutti. It is: the function of
punishment, the "redeeming of the criminal through repentance"; a question which We should like to formulate in this manner: crime and
punishment in their reciprocal relationship. We should wish, that is, to
indicate in broad outline the path of a man from the state of noncriminality, through the actual crime, to the state of criminal guilt and its
punishment (reatus culpae et poenae), and vice versa, the return from
this state, through repentance and expiation, to the state of liberation
from the crime and punishment. We shall be able then to see more
clearly what is the origin of punishment, what is its nature, what its
function, what form it should take in order to conduct the criminal to
his liberation.
The Path toward Crime and Punishment
It is necessary here to make two preliminary remarks.
Above all, the problem of crime and of punishment is a problem
concerned with persons, and this under a double aspect. The path toward
crime takes its beginning from the person of the one acting, from his
"Ego." In the sum of the actions which proceed from the Ego as from a
center of action, there is question here only of those which are based
upon a conscious and voluntary determination; that is, acts which the
Ego was able to perform or not perform, those which it performs because
it has freely determined to do so. This central function of the Ego with
regard to itself - even if operating under various influences of a different
nature - is an essential element when there is question of true crime and
true punishment.
tThis address was prepared for the December 5, 1954 meeting of the Italian Association of Catholic Jurists. (Translation taken from 53 CATHOLIC MIND 364 (1955).)

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

The criminal act, however, is also always
an opposition of one person against another, both when the immediate object of
the crime is a thing, as in theft, and when it
is a person, as in murder; further, the Ego
of the person who becomes a criminal is
directed against higher authority, and therefore in the end always against the authority
of God. In this matter We, Who have as
Our aim the true problem of crime and
punishment properly so-called, prescind
from the merely juridical crime and from
its consequent penalty.
-It is also to be observed that the person
and the function of the person who is the
criminal form a strict unity, which in its
turn presents different aspects. Simultaneously it concerns the psychological, juridical, ethical and religious fields. These
aspects can certainly also be considered
separately; but in true crime and punishment they are so closely related among
themselves that only by taking them all
together -is it possible to form a correct
concept about the criminal and the question of crime and punishment. It is not even
possible, therefore, to treat this problem
unilaterally, merely under its juridical
aspect.
The path toward crime therefore is this:
the spirit of a man is found in the following
situation: it is faced with the performance
or omission of an action, and this performance or omission is presented to it as simply
obligatory, as an absolute "you must," an
unconditional demand to be fulfilled by a
personal decision. The man refuses to obey
this demand: he rejects the good, accepts
the evil. When the internal resolution is not
terminated within itself, it is followed by the
external action. Thus the criminal action is
accomplished both internally and
externally.

As far as the subjective side of the crime
is concerned, in order to judge rightly it is
necessary to take into account .not only the
external act, but also the influences, both
internal and external, which have cooperated in the decision of the criminal, such as
innate or acquired dispositions, impulses or
obstructions, impressions from education,
stimulations from persons or things in the
midst of which the person lives, circumstantial factors, and in a particular way the
habitual and actual intensity of the will-act,
the so-called "criminal urge," which has
contributed to the accomplishment of the
criminal act.
Considered in the object affected by it,
the criminal action is an arrogant contempt
for authority, which demands the orderly
maintenance of what is right and good, and
which is the source, the guardian, the defender and the vindicator of order itself.
And since all human authority cannot be
derived ultimately except from God, every
criminal act is an opposition to God Himself, to His supreme law and sovereign majesty. This religious aspect is inherently and
essentially connected with the criminal act.
The object affected by this act is also the
legally established community, if and in as
far as it places in danger and violates the
order established by the laws. Nevertheless
not every true criminal act, as described
above, has the character of a crime against
the public law. Public authority must be
concerned only with those criminal actions
which injure the orderly society as established by law. Hence, the rule concerning
a juridical crime: no crime where there is
no law. But such a violation, if it is otherwise a true criminal act in itself, is also
always a violation of the ethical and religious norm. It follows therefore that those
human laws which are in contradiction to
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divine laws cannot form the basis for a true
criminal act against the public law.
Connected with the concept of the criminal act is the concept that the author of the
act becomes deserving of punishment (reatus poenae). The problem of punishment
has its beginning, in an individual case, at
the moment in which a man becomes a
criminal. The punishment is the reaction,
required by law and justice, to the crime:
they are like a blow and a counter-blow.
The order violated by the criminal act demands the restoration and re-establishment
of the equilibrium which has been disturbed. It is the proper task of law and
justice to guard and preserve the harmony
between duty, on the one hand, and the
law, on the other, and to re-establish this
harmony if it has been injured. The punishment in itself touches not the criminal
act, but the author of it, his person, his Ego,
which with conscious determination has
performed the criminal act. Likewise the
punishing does not proceed, as it were, from
an abstract juridical ordination, but from
the concrete person invested with legitimate
authority. As the criminal act, so also the
punishment opposes person to person.
Punishment properly so-called cannot
therefore have any other meaning and purpose than that just mentioned, to bring back
again into the order of duty the violator of
the law, who had withdrawn from it. This
order of duty is necessarily an expression of
the order of being, of the order of the true
and the good, which alone has the right of
existence, in opposition to error and evil,
which represent that which should not
exist. Punishment accomplishes its purpose
in its own way, in as far as it compels the
criminal, because of the act performed, to
suffer, that is, it deprives him of a good and
imposes upon him an evil. But in order that
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this suffering may be a punishment, the
causal connection with the crime is
essential.
The State of Guilt and Punishment
We add that the criminal has brought
about, by his act, a state which does not
automatically cease when the act itself is
completed. He remains the man who has
consciously and deliberately violated a law
which binds him (reatus culpae), and simultaneously he is involved in the penalty
(reatus poenae). This personal condition
endures, both in his relation to the authority
on which he depends (or better, the human
authority of public law in so far as this has
a share in the corresponding penal process), and at all times also in his relation to
the supreme divine authority. There is thus
brought about an enduring state of guilt
and punishment, which indicates a definite
condition of the guilty party in the eyes of
the authority offended, and of this authority with respect to the -guilty party. (St.
Thomas: Sum. Theol. III, q. 69, a.2, obj. 3
et ad 3.)
An attempt has been made - based on
the idea that time and space, formally considered, are not simply realities, but instruments or forms of thought - to draw the
conclusion that, after the cessation of- the
sinful action and of the actual punishment,
one can no longer speak of any permanent
quality belonging to them in reality, in the
real order, and therefore, of any state of
guilt or punishment. If this were so, one
should have to abandon the principle:
"What's done, cannot be undone." Applied
to a spiritual action - such as a criminal act
is of its very nature - this principle would
be based (as is asserted) on a false valuation, and on an erroneous use, of the concept of time. We would be going outside the

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

limits of Our discourse if We were to treat
here of the question of space and time. It
will be enough to note that space and time
are not simply thought-forms, but have a
basis in reality. At any rate, the conclusion
which is drawn from them against the existence of a state of guilt is invalid. Undoubtedly man's fall into sin takes place on this
earth in a definite place and at a definite
time, but it is not a quality of that place or
that time, and, therefore, its cessation is not
connected with the cessation of a "here"
and a "now."
What We have so far explained concerns
the essence of the state of guilt and punishment. On the other hand, by virtue of the
special prerogative of the higher authority,
to which the culprit has refused due obedience and submission, its indignation and
disapproval turn against not only the action, but its author, against his person on
account of the action.
With the act of crime is immediately
linked, as was just now indicated, not the,
punishment itself, but the guiltiness and
punishability of the action. Nonetheless,
there is not excluded a penalty, which, by
virtue of a law, is incurred automatically at
the moment of the criminal action. In
Canon Law are recognized penalties ("latae
sententiae") liable to be incurred by the
very fact of committing a sin. In civil law,
such a penalty is rare, nay, in some legal
systems, unknown. Always, moreover, this
automatic incurring of a penalty supposes
real and serious guilt.
Consequently, it is customary for the
penalty to be imposed by a competent authority. That presupposes a penal law actually in force, a legal person invested with
authority to punish, and in him certain
knowledge of the act to be punished, as
much from the objective standpoint, that is

to say, concerning the actual commission of
the crime contemplated by the law, as from
the subjective standpoint, that is, from a
consideration of the culpability of the guilty
one, its gravity and extension.
This knowledge, necessary for pronouncing a penal sentence, is, before the court of
God the Supreme Judge, perfectly clear and
infallible, and to have called attention to it
cannot be without interest to the jurist. God
was present to the man in the internal resolve, and in the external execution of the
criminal act, having all fully within His gaze
down to the last detail; all is before Him
now, as in the moment of the act. But this
knowledge in absolute fullness and sovereign certainty, at every instant of life, and
over every human act, is proper to God
alone. Because of this, there belongs to God
alone the final judgment on the value of a
man, and the decision on his ultimate fate.
He pronounces the judgment as He finds
the man at the moment He calls him to
eternity. Yet an infallible judgment of God
exists also during life on earth, and not only
taken as a whole, but over every sinful act,
together with the corresponding penalty;
yet, in spite of the ever-ready divine disposition to forgiveness and remission, in some
cases He carries it into effect during the
present life of the man.
The human judge, on the other hand,
since he does not possess the omnipresence
and omniscience of God, has the duty of
forming for himself, before issuing a judicial sentence, a moral certainty - that is,
one which excludes every reasonable and
serious doubt about the external fact and
the internal culpability. But he does not
have immediate insight into the interior
dispositions of the accused at the very moment of the crime; rather in most cases the
judge is not in a position to reconstruct
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them with absolute clarity from the arguments offered in proof, nor, often enough,
even from the confession of the delinquent.
But this difficulty should not be exaggerated
as though it were ordinarily impossible for
a human judge to attain sufficient certainty,
and therefore a solid foundation for a sentence. According to the cases, the judge will
not fail to consult renowned specialists on
the capacity and responsibility of the presumed criminal, and to take into consideration the findings of the modern sciences of
psychology, psychiatry and characterology.
If, despite all these precautions, there still
remains a grave and serious doubt, no conscientious judge will proceed to pronounce
a sentence o.f cuue. ation, all the more
so when there is a question of an irrevocable punishment, such as the death penalty.
In most crimes external behavior is already sufficient manifestation of the internal
motivation which was responsible for the
crime. Therefore, ordinarily one can - and
at times one even should - deduce a substantially sound conclusion from the exterior; otherwise juridical actions would be
rendered impossible for mankind. On the
other hand, one should not forget that no
human sentence finally and definitely settles
the fate of a man, but only the judgment of
God, both for single acts and for those of
a lifetime. Consequently, in. every case
where human judges have erred, the Supreme Judge will re-establish equilibrium,
first of all, immediately after death with the
definitive judgment on the whole life of a
man, and then later and more fully in the
final and universal judgment before all men.
This is not to be understood as though it
dispenses a judge from conscientious and
exact efforts in ascertaining the facts. Still,
there is something magnificent in the realization that there will be a final equation of
guilt and punishment which will be abso-
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lutely perfect.
Whoever has the duty of guarding the
accused person in protective custody should
not fail to bear in mind the painful burden
which the investigation itself inflicts upon
the prisoner, even when those methods of
investigation are not being employed which
cannot be justified in any way. Ordinarily
these sufferings are not taken into account
when the penalty is finally inflicted, a consideration which would be difficult to
realize. However they should not be lost
sight of.
In external juridical matters the sentence
of the court is definitive for all that concerns guilt and punishment.
in your sessions, illustrious gentlemen,
there was manifested the, desire that by
means of legislation some relaxation be
introduced in the obligation which binds
the judge to the articles of the penal code.
Not, of course, in the way the duty of the
praetor was interpreted by Roman law,
"adiuvandi, supplendi vel corrigendi iuris
civilis gratia" ("to help, supplement or
correct civil law"), but in the sense of a
freer evaluation of the objective facts
over and above the general juridical limits
set by legislative authority. Thus, even in
penal law, a kind of "analogia iuris" would
be applicable, and the discretional power
of the judge would be extended beyond the
limits hitherto accepted as valid. It is believed that in such a way there would result
a notable simplification of penal laws and
a considerable diminution of the number
of particular crimes. At the same time it
would help to make people better understand exactly what the state considers
deserving of punishment, and for what
reasons.
For this proposition a certain foundation
can surely be admitted. In any case, the
ends which this proposition has in view -
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namely, the simplification of the norms of
law, the prominence given not only to strict
formal law but also to equity and spontaneous good judgment, the better adaptation of penal law to popular sentiment are not, We say, vulnerable to objection.
The difficulty would arise not so much on
the theoretical side as from the form of
its realization, which, on the one hand,
should preserve the guarantees of the existing order and, on the other hand, take into
account the new needs and reasonable desires of reform. Canon Law offers examples
in this sense, as is evident from Canons
2220-2223 of the Code of Canon Law.
In what concerns the various kinds of
penalties, penalties concerning honor, [juridical capacity], inheritance, personal freedom, body and life - bodily punishment is
not provided for in Italian law - We will,
in Our explanation, limit Our remarks concerning them to the nature and purpose of
punishment. Since, however, as We have
already noted, some jurists do not hold the
same opinion concerning the meaning and
purpose of punishment, it follows that their
views of various punishments are also different.
Up to a certain point it may be true that
imprisonment and isolation, properly applied, is the penalty most likely to effect a
return of the criminal to right order and
social life. But it does not follow that it is
the only just and effective one. What We
said in Our discourse on international
penal law, on Oct. 3, 1953, referring to
the theory of retribution, is to the point
here. Many, though not all, reject vindictive punishment, even if it is proposed to
be accompanied by medicinal penalties. We
then declared that it would not be just to
reject completely, and as a matter of principle, the function of vindictive punishment. As long as man is on earth, such

punishment can and should help toward
his definitive rehabilitation, provided man
himself does not raise barriers to its efficacy, which, indeed, is in no way opposed
to the purpose of righting and restoring
disturbed harmony, which, as We already
pointed out, is an essential element of
punishment.
The inflicting of punishment finds its
natural complement in its being, carried
out as the effective privation of a good, or
the positive imposition of an evil, by competent authority as a-reaction to the criminal action. It is a weight placed to restore
balance in the disturbed juridical order,
and not aimed immediately at the fault as
such. The criminal action has revealed in
the guilty person an element that clashes
with the common good and with well
ordered life with others. Such an element
must be removed from the culprit. The
process of removing it may be compared
with the intervention of a doctor in the
body, an intervention which may be painful, especially when the cause of sickness,
and not the symptoms, must be dealt with.
The culprit's own good, and, perhaps,
more so that of the community, demand
that the ailing member become sound
again. The meting out of punishment, however, no less than the healing of the sick,
demands a clear diagnosis of causes, not
merely of symptoms, a therapy adapted to
the ailment, a cautious prognosis and a
suitable prophylaxis.
The meaning and purpose of the punishment, and the intention of the punishing
authority, which is usually in agreement
with that purpose, indicate the attitude the
culprit should have; it is that of acknowledgment of the evil done, which provoked
the penalty; of aversion from, and repudiation of, the evil deed itself, of repentance,
expiation and purification, and purpose of
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future amendment. That is the path the
condemned man should follow. The problem, however, is whether he will really
take it. Turning Our attention to such a
question, it may be helpful to consider the
suffering caused by the punishment, according to its various aspects: psychological, juridical, moral and religious, though
normally these various aspects are all
closely united in the concrete.
Psychologically, nature spontaneously reacts against the physical evil in the penalty,
her reaction being all the stronger in proportion to the suffering imposed on human
nature as such, or on the individual temperament. Along with this, there is a fixing,
likewise spontaneo-us, of the cu.lpit's attcntion on the criminal action which caused
his punishment, and whose connection is
now vividly before his mind, or at least
is now uppermost in his conscience.
Following such more or less involuntary
attitudes, there appears the conscious and
willed reaction of the Ego, the center and
source of all personal actions. This higher
reaction can be a voluntary, positive acceptance, as is shown by the good thief on
the cross: "We receive what our deeds
merit" (Luke, 23, 41). It may be mere
passive resignation; or at times it may be
a deep bitterness, a total interior collapse;
then, too, it may be a proud resistance,
which at times becomes a hardening in
evil; finally it may be a complete revolt,
savage but impotent. Such psychological
reactions take differing forms, depending
on whether there is question of a long
punishment, or of a short punishment,
short in time, but surpassing in height and
depth all time-measure - the pain of death,
for example.
Juridically, execution of the punishment
implies the valid, effective action of the
higher and stronger power of the juridical
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community (or rather, of the one possessing authority in this community) on the
law-breaker, who, obstinately opposed to
the law, has culpably violated the established juridical order, and now is-forced
to submit to the prescriptions of that order.
-for the greater good of the community
and of the criminal himself. Thus the idea
and necessity of penal law is clear.
On the other hand, justice demands that,
in carrying out the provisions of penal
law, any increase of those punishments
provided for the case, as also any arbitrary
harshness, annoyance or provocation, be
avoided. Higher authority must see to the
carrying out of the punishment, and give
it a form
hich w i! orresnondi to its purpose, not in an unyielding fulfillment of
minute prescriptions, but in adapting it, so
far as possible, to the person to be punished. Indeed the gravity and dignity of the
power to punish, and its exercise, naturally
indicate that the public authority view as
its main duty contact with the person of
the guilty one. Judgment on him must be
made, therefore, according to special circumstances, if the functioning of that office
is to be fully taken care of through the
proper channels. Very often, if not always,
one aspect of punishment must be entrusted to others, especially the real and
effective care of souls.
Some have proposed that it would be
well to establish a religious congregation
or a secular institute which would care
more extensively for the psychological assistance of prisoners. Undoubtedly nuns
have long been bringing the warmth and
good influence of Christian charity to women's prisons; for Us this is a good opportunity to express to them Our gratitude.
Still, the above-mentioned proposal seems
worthy of deep study, and We express the
hope that a like foundation, no less than
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those religious and ecclesiastical associations already active in houses of detention,
will give full play to the energies released
by the Christian Faith; We hope, too, that
all the solid results produced by investigation and experience in the field of psychology, psychiatry, pedagogy and sociology
will be used to the advantage of the imprisoned. This naturally presupposes a
thorough professional training in those
called to such work.
No one who is in any way familiar with
the actual 'application of punishment will
nurse utopian dreams of great success. The
good-will of the prisoner must match any
outside influence, but that cannot be gotten
by force. May divine grace arouse and
direct that good-will!
The moral aspect of carrying out of punishment and the sufferings effected are in
relation to the purpose and principles
which should determine the dispositions of
the condemned.
To suffer in this life means practically a
turning of the soul within itself; it is a path
which drives one from the superficial to'
deep within oneself. Considered in that
light, suffering has great moral value. Presupposing a right intention, its free acceptance is a priceless act. "Patientia opus
pertectum habet," ("Suffering makes a
perfect work"), writes St. James (1, 4).
That is true also of the sufferings caused
by punishment, which can bring progress
to one's interior life. By its nature it is a
reparation and a restoration - through and
in the guilty person, and willed by him - of
the culpably violated social order. The essence of the return to good consists more
exactlyT in breaking away from the fault
than in the free acceptance of suffering.
Suffering, however, can lead to this break,
and turning away from one's wrongdoing
can, in its turn, be of great moral value,

and facilitate and elevate its moral effectiveness. Thus, suffering can reach moral
heroism, heroic patience and expiation.
In the area of moral reaction, however,
contrary manifestations are not lacking.
Often the moral value of punishment is not
even recognized; often it is consciously and
deliberately rejected. The criminal will
neither recognize nor confess his guilt, will
in no way submit to good, wills no expiation or repentance for his own crimes.
And now a few words on the religious
aspect of the suffering which results from
punishment.
Every moral transgression of man, even
if materially committed only in the sphere
of legitimate human laws and then punished by men according to positive human
law, is always a sin before God and calls
down upon itself from God a punitive
judgment. Not to take this into account
is contrary to the interest of public authority. Sacred Scripture (Romans 13, 2-4)
teaches that human authority, within its
own limits, is, when there is question of
inflicting punishment, nothing else than the
minister of divine justice. "For he is God's
minister: an avenger to execute wrath upon
him that doth evil."
This religious element in the infliction
of punishment finds its expression and
realization in the person of the guilty one,
in so far as he humbles himself under the
hand of God Who is punishing him through
the instrumentality of men; thus he is accepting his sufferings from God, offering
them to God as a partial payment of the
debt which he has contracted before God.
Accepted in this way, punishment becomes
for the guilty person a source of interior
purification on this earth, of complete conversion, of resolution for the future, a bulwark against possible relapse. Suffering
thus accepted with faith, repentance and
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love is sanctified by the pains of Christ and
supported by His grace. This religious and
holy meaning of suffering due to punishment is impressed upon us by the words
which the good thief addressed to his crucified companion: "We receive the due rewards of our deeds," and by his prayer to
the dying Redeemer: "Lord, remember me
when thou shalt come into thy kingdom";
a prayer which, when weighed upon the
scales of God, brought to the repentant
sinner the assurance of the Saviour: "This
day thou shalt be with me in paradise"
-(Luke 23, 41-43); the first plenary indulgence, as it were, granted by Christ
Himself.
May all who have fallen under the blows
of human justice suffer the punishment inflicted upon them not in a spirit of duress,
not without God and without Christ, not
in revolt against God, not spiritually shattered by anguish; but may it open for them
the way which leads to holiness.
Liberation From the State of Guilt
and of Punishment
It remains now to speak of the final section of the path which We wished to point
out to you, that is, the return from the
state of guilt and punishment to that of
liberation.
Liberation from guilt and liberation
from punishment are not necessarily identified, either in concept or in reality.
Prescinding from the fact that, in the sight
of God, the remission of eternal punishment is always connected with the remission of grave guilt - guilt may be remitted
without necessarily implying the extinguishing of the penalty. On the other hand,
the penalty may have been paid without
the guilt having ceased to exist in the inner
being of the culprit.
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Now, the return to the juridical and
ethical order consists essentially in the
liberation from guilt, and not from punishment.
In the exposition of the first section of
this path, We pointed out the internal and
external character of the guilty act, that is,
in relation to its author, as also in its relations to higher authority, which is, in the
last analysis, the authority of God Himself,
Whose majesty, justice and holiness are
slighted and offended in every culpable act.
Liberation from guilt must, therefore,
reintegrate the relations disturbed by the
culpable act. If we are dealing with a
simple real debt, that is, one that is concerned with purely material considerations,
it may be fully extinguished by the handing
over of the thing required, without the
necessity of any personal contact with the
other party. If, however, there is question
of a personal offense (either by itself or
connected with a real debt), then the culprit is bound to an obligation, in the strict
sense, to the person of the creditor. It is
from this strict obligation that he must be
released. And because, as We have already
said, this obligation has a psychological,
juridical, moral and religious aspect, so his
liberation must have a similar aspect.
Guilt, however, in its internal element,
also implies in the culprit a state of enslavement and of bondage on his part to
the object to which he has given himself
in the performance of the culpable act;
that is, in substance, an enslavement to a
pseudo-ego whose tendencies, impulses and
ends constitute in man a caricature of the
genuine ego, intended by the Creator and
by nature only for the good and the true.
This contradicts those norms of the right
path according to whose direction man,
made in the image of God, should act and
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form himself. From this enslavement also
must there be effected a psychological, juridical, moral and religious liberation. :
In human law, we may speak of a sort
of liberation from guilt when the public
authority no longer proceeds against the
culpable act; for example, even without
regard to the actual internal dispositions of
the culprit, by positive remission of the
guilt on the part of authority, or because
there has expired the period established by
the law within which exclusively the same
authority intends, under certain conditions,
to bring before its tribunal, and to pass
judgment upon, the violation of the law
that has taken place. However, this way
does not constitute an interior conversion,
a metanoia, a liberation of the ego from
its interior slavery, from its will to evil and
to illegality. Now, it is only to this liberation from guilt in its proper meaning, to
this metanoia (that is, change of mental
attitude), that We would wish here to
draw attention.
Psychologically considered, the liberation from guilt is the abandonment and retraction of the perverse will freely and
consciously placed by the ego in the culpable act, and the renewed intention to
will what is right and good. This change of
Will presupposes a return into oneself, and
hence an understanding of the evil and
culpability of the resolution formerly taken
against the good recognized as obligatory.
There is united to such understanding the
reprobation of the evil done, repentance as
directly willed sorrow, deliberate regretfulness in the soul for the evil perpetrated
because it was wicked, contrary to law and,
in fine, contrary to God. In this catharsis
of the inner being, there is also accomplished and included a withdrawing from
the false good to which man had turned in

his guilty act. The culprit begins to submit
himself to the order of justice and right,
in obedience to its author and guardian,
against whom he had rebelled.
This leads psychologically to the final
step. Since the culpable act - as already
mentioned - is not the offense directed
.against an abstract norm of law, but is, in
substance, a stand against the person of
the obligating or prohibiting authority,
complete conversion tends, through psychological necessity in one form or another,
toward the person of the offended authority
with the explicit or implicit sorrowful
confession of the fault, and with interior
petition for remission and pardon. Holy
Scripture gives us brief and classic examples of such repentance, like the words
of the publican in the Temple: "0 God,
be merciful to me, a sinner." (Luke 18,
13); or the words of the prodigal son:
"Father, I have sinned" (Luke 15, 21).
In spite of this, when considered under
the purely psychological aspect, the perverse will expressed in the culpable act can
end in another way without attaining release from guilt. The culprit no longer
thinks of his act, but he has not actually
retracted it; it has simply ceased to weigh
upon his conscience. Now, it should be
clearly stated that such a psychological
process does not constitute a release from
guilt, just as falling asleep in the evening
does not signify or obtain the removal,
much less the suppression, of the evil committed during the day. Nowadays, some
will perhaps say that the guilt has been
submerged in the subconscious or the unconscious. But it is still there.
Nor would any better result be obtained
with the attempt to suppress the psychological awareness of guilt by means of autosuggestion or external suggestion, or even
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by means of clinical psychotherapy, of
psychoanalysis. A real, free, guilty will
cannot be psychologically corrected or suppressed by insinuating the persuasion that
it has never existed. We have indicated the
deplorable consequences of a like treatment of the question of guilt in the discourse addressed to the members of the
Fifth International Congress of Psychotherapy and Clinical Psychology, April
15, 1953. ,
A final observation must yet be made on
this question of psychological liberation
from guilt. A single, fully conscious and
free act can contain all the psychic elements of a true conversion; but its depth,
firmness and extent can present defects
which, if not essential, are at least appreciable. A profound, extended and lasting
liberation from guilt is often a lengthy
process which only gradually reaches maturity, particularly if the culpable act has
been the fruit of an habitual disposition of
the will. The psychology of relapses offers
more than sufficient material for proof on
this point, and the supporters of the purifying, educative and fortifying function of
a somewhat lengthy imprisonment find in
these experiences a confirmation of their
theory.
Juridical liberation from guilt, as distinct
from the psychological conversion that is
accomplished in the intimate will of the
culprit, is directed essentially to the higher
authority, whose requirements for observance of established norms have been
slighted or violated. Private violations of
legal rights, if they have occurred in good
faith or otherwise, do not prejudice the
common good, are settled privately between the parties or by means of a civil
action. They are not ordinarily the object
of penal law.
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In the analysis of the culpable act, We
have already pointed out that it constitutes
the withdrawal and the negation of due
subordination, due service, due devotion,
due respect and homage; that it is objectively an offense against the loftiness and
majesty of the law, or rather of the law's
Author, Guardian, Judge and Vindicator.
The exigencies of justice, and hence juridical liberation from guilt, require that
as much service, subordination, devotion,
homage and honor be restored to authority
as were taken from that authority by the
delict.
This satisfaction may be performed
freely; it may also, in the suffering endured
because of the penalty inflicted, be to a
certain degree forced; it may at one and
the same time be forced and free. Law in
modem nations does not attach much importance to voluntary reparation. It is content to have the will of the culprit, by
means of the penalty suffered, submit to
the powerful will of public authority, and
to re-educate his will in this way to work, to
social relations, to right action. It is not to
be denied that such a method of procedure can, by reason of immanent psychological laws, lead to an interior reform,
and hence to an interior liberation from
guilt. But that this must happen, or regularly does happen, is still to be demonstrated. In any event, not to take into
consideration, as a matter of principle, the
will of the culprit to give satisfaction insofar as sound juridical sense and violated
justice require, is a deficiency and a lacuna,
the bridging of which is earnestly demanded by the interests of doctrine and of
fidelity to the fundamental principles of
penal law.
However, juridical liberation from guilt
comprises not only the will to perform the
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required reparation but the actual reparation itself. Here science and the circumstances of concrete life are frequently confronted by a difficult question: what should
be the rule in the event of moral or physical
inability to perform such reparation? Must
we recur to a sort of compensation or substitution, or may the exigencies of violated
law be left without reparation?
We have already indicated that man, by
means of a culpable act committed with
full responsibility, is capable of offending
or of destroying certain goods and juridical
obligations; but after the fact he is often
no-longer in a position to provide adequate
satisfaction. This is true in the instance of
murder, of privation of sight, of mutilation,
of full sexual violation, of adultery, of definitive destruction of another's good name,
of the declaration of an unjust war, of the
betrayal of state secrets, of certain forms
of l se majest, , and of other like delicts.
The law of retaliation would inflict a
proportionate evil on the culprit. However,
by this alone, the one injured in his rights
would not receive reparation nor have his
rights restored. But, prescinding from the
fact that adequate indemnity is not impossible in all cases, it should be noted
that judgment on the guilt regards not so
much the damaged good of the other party,
but principally the person of the culprit
and his perverse will exercised to his own
advantage.
In opposition to this is the offering or
reparation made by the culprit at his own
expense, from his personal being, property
and ability, for the benefit of another, that
is, in every case, of the violated law,
namely, of the superior authority. Thus
active reparation, which includes the interior conversion of the will, is for the
culprit who, at his own expense, performs

the required satisfaction, the second of the
two above-indicated elements which constitute liberation from guilt. The same cannot be said of purely passive reparation
when the culprit is forced to bow beneath
the suffering that this reparation implies.
This purely passive satisfaction, from
which any element of voluntary and repentant will is lacking, is thus deprived of
the essential element of liberation from
guilt. Consequently, the culprit remains in
his culpable condition.
We have many times pointed out that
every grave culpable act is in the last analysis an offense before God, Who has an
absolute, because divine, right to obedience and submission, to service and praise,
and Who as Author, Guardian, Judge and
Avenger of the juridical order makes
known to the culprit His exigencies with
that unconditional absoluteness which is
proper to the intimate manifestations of
conscience. In the guilty resolution of the
ego, man slights God Who thus reveals
Himself, he leaves aside the infinite good,
the absolute majesty, and in this way
places himself by his action above God.
But if man repents and returns to his
proper subordination before the majesty
of God, if, in conscious and complete
surrender of his ego to the supreme infinite good, he separates himself from his
culpable act in its deepest roots in order
once again to be free in good and in his
God, he nevertheless finds it impossible
to make reparation by his own powers
(that is, as derived from his own being,
will and potency) in any proportionate
fashion for that which he has committed
in the sight of God by his act. He has
offended and slighted an absolutely infinite
good, an absolutely unlimited right, a supreme majesty. In the gravity of his fault
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there thus intervenes this absolute infinity,
while anything that man might offer or
actuate is essentially, intensively and extensively, finite. Even were such reparation to endure until the end of time, it can
never reach a stage of equality - tantum
quantum - between the exigency of God
and the offering or reparation of man.
God has bridged this abyss; He has put
into the hands of finite man an infinite
price; He has accepted as an offering of
reparation for guilty man the ransom offered by Christ, which is super-abundant
because it is of infinite value in submission, honor and glorification, by reason of
its derivation from the hypostatic union.
As long as time will endure, this ransom
remits for repentant man his guilt before
God through the merits of Jesus Christ.
Let it not be said that these theological
and religious considerations lie outside the
field and the interests of science and juridical practice. Doubtless a sharp distinction
of competencies is an advantage to life and
to any true science; but in this self-limitation one must not reach the point of
denying or ignoring explicitly inseparable
connections which by intrinsic necessity are
manifested on every side. In every real
offense - in whatever material field it may
have taken place- there is contained a
relation with the ultimate requirement of
all law and of all order. It is a characteristic or prerogative of the world of law that
there is nothing in it which in its fundamental structure has been created withoutthis supreme requirement, or which in its
final analysis can be made intelligible without this transcendent relation. In this there
is no debasement, but rather an elevation
of law and of juridical science, for which
total laicization is an impoverishment, not
an enrichment.
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The ancient Romans united law and
right (ius ac fas), notwithstanding the difference in concepts, and they always conceived them as related to the divinity. If
now modern depth-psychology is correct,
there is in the innate dynamisms of the
subconscious and the unconscious a tendency which draws toward the transcendent
and makes the essence of the soul gravitate
toward God. The analysis of the. guiltprocess and of liberation from guilt reveals
the same tendency toward the transcendent.
This analysis brings forward considerations
and aspects which the science and practice
of penal law do not of course have to treat
of directly, but about which they should
have sufficient knowledge in order that
others may make them useful to the end
of the execution of the penalty and apply
them to the advantage of the culprit.
Moral liberation from guilt coincides
substantially for the most part with what
We have already said concerning psychological and juridical liberation. It is the
reprobation and withdrawal of the positive
contempt and violation of the moral order
committed by the culpable act; it is the
conscious and voluntary return of the penitent culprit to submission and conformity
with the ethical order and its obligatory
requirements. There are comprised in these
positive acts the endeavor and the offering
of the guilty one to satisfy the just demands
of violated law of the ethical order, or
better, of the Author, Lord, Guardian and
Vindicator of that order. And there appears
the conscious will and resolution of the
culprit to be faithful in future to the precepts of what is right and good. In its essential parts, then,. this liberation consists
in that interior disposition which has been
indicated in the statement presented by you
as the purpose and the fruit of the right
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fulfillment of the penalty, even though it
is here considered and circumscribed under
a slightly different viewpoint.
Finally, by religious liberation there is
understood liberation from that interior
guilt which burdens and binds the person
of the culprit in the sight of God, that is to
say, before the supreme and ultimate requirement and necessity of all law and of
every moral obligation, Who with His infinity covers and protects His will and His
law, which has come forth, either immediately from Himself, or mediately from
some legitimate human authority within
the area of its own competence.
How man can free himself or be freed
from his offense against God has been
already sufficiently explained in the second
point concerning the juridical aspect. But
if this final religious deliverance is not
manifested to the culprit, or at least if the
way to such is not pointed out or made
smooth - if only by means of a long and
severe penalty - then in such a case very
little, not to say nothing, is offered to guilty
"man" in his punishment, however much
one may talk of psychic cure, of re-education, of social formation of the person, or
emancipation from aberrations and from
enslavement to himself.
Doubtless these expressions mean
something that is good and important; but
for all that, man remains in his guilt before
the supreme necessity upon which his final.
destiny depends. This necessity can wait
and often does wait at length, but in the
end it consigns the culprit to the guilt from
which he is unwilling to desist, and to the
consequences of that guilt. It is indeed
sorrowful to have to say about a man: "It
were better for that man if he had not been
born" (Matt. 26, 24).
Therefore, if someone or something can

contribute toward warding off such an evil,
even though it be penal law or the execution of a lawful penalty, no effort should
be spared. All the more since God during
this life is always most willing to effect
a reconciliation. He incites man to accomplish internally the psychic withdrawal from
his senseless act; He offers to welcome him
once again, if he repents, into His friendship and His love. May human penal law,
in its judgments and in the execution of
those judgments, never forget the man in
the culprit and never omit to strengthen
him and assist him to return to God!
The return from the state of guilt and of
punishment necessarily includes liberation
not only from the guilt, but also from the
penalty; only thus is there obtained that
"restitutio in integrum," as it were, a
restitution to the original state or condition
of non-culpability and hence of nonpenalty.
Recent facts and statements suggest to
Us at this point a brief declaration. Not
every penalty that is incurred bears within
itself its own remission. Revelation and the
teaching authority of the Church establish
clearly that, after the end of this earthly
life, those who are burdened with grave
guilt will receive from the Most High God
a judgment and an execution of penalty
from which there is no liberation or condonation. God could, in the next life, also
remit such a punishment; everything depends on His free will; but He has never
granted it and will never do so.
There is no point in discussing here
whether this fact can be established with
certainty by the force of reason alone - as
some assert, while others consider it doubtful. But both opinions contain, in their arguments based on reason, considerations
which indicate that such a divine disposi-
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tion is in no way contrary to any of God's
attributes: neither to His justice or His
wisdom, neither to His mercy or His
goodness. Furthermore, these considerations
show that the divine disposition is by no
means opposed to the human nature bestowed by the same Creator; with its absolute metaphysical finality directed to God,
with the impulse of the human will toward
God, with the physical liberty of the will
rooted and ever permanent in created
man.
All these reflections may perhaps leave
in man, when he makes his judgments
relying on his own reason alone, a final
question, not so much about the possibility,
but rather about the reality of such an
inflexible decree of the Supreme Judge.
Hence, it will not arouse too much astonishment if a noted theologian could write,
at the beginning of the seventeenth century: "There are four mysteries of our
most holy Faith which are most difficult
for the human mind to believe: the mystery
of the Trinity, of the Incarnation, of the
Eucharist, and of eternal punishment"
(Lessius, De Perfectionibus moribusque
divinis, lib. XIII, cap. XXV).
Nevertheless, the fact of the immutability and the eternity of that judgment of
reprobation and of its fulfillment is beyond
dispute. The discussions which have arisen
because of a recently published book
(Giovanni Papini, Il Diavolo; Vallecchi,
1954) frequently portray a grave lack of
understanding of Catholic doctrine, and
they are founded on premises that are
either false or falsely understood. In the
present instance the Supreme Legislator, in
the use of His sovereign and absolute
power, has established the unending validity
of His judgment and of its execution.
Hence, this limitless duration is the law
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now in force.
But let us now turn to the field of human
law, which is the principal object of the
present discourse. As We have already
indicated, liberation from guilt and liberation from punishment do not always coincide. The guilt may come to an end and the
penalty continue, and then on the other
hand, the guilt may continue in force while
the penalty terminates.
There are various forms of cessation of
punishment. It is first of all clear that such
cessation is reached automatically at the
moment in which the. penalty inflicted has
been paid, or when the period of time
originally set down has been passed, or
else when its continuance (sometimes its
very execution) was connected with a condition, either resolutory or suspensive, and
this condition has been sufficiently fulfilled.
Remission is another form of cessation
of the penalty, by means of an act of the
competent higher authority. This may take
the form of a favor, an indult or an
amnesty, which is somewhat analogous in
the field of religion to the "indulgence."
The power to issue such acts of clemency
does not rest with the judge who has pronounced the sentence of condemnation,
applying to the individual case the penalty
established in law. Per se, it resides with
the power that judges and punishes in its
own name and in virtue of its own law.
Hence, the right to remit the penalty avails
ordinarily in the life of the state as something reserved to the supreme authority.
That authority can exercise this right by
means of a general decree or by one concerned with an individual case.
Certain favors or mitigations in the
execution of the penalty, which leave its
substance unchanged, but which are
granted to the culprit by reason of good
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conduct or for other motives, are not included under the heading of remission or
condonation. Besides, remission of the penalty in the proper sense is applied both to
"medicinal penalties" and also to "vindictive penalties" where these latter are admitted.
The final stage of man's road through
guilt and punishment leads anew to the
problem, already mentioned several times,
of the highest aim or object of the penalty,
and particularly about the sense, or according to some, the non-sense, of a purely
vindictive penalty.
In Our discourse of October 3, 1953, to
the 6th International Congress of Penal
Law, and also on the present occasion, We
called attention to the fact that many, perhaps the majority, of civil jurists reject
vindictive punishment. We noted, however,
that perhaps the considerations and arguments adduced as proof were being given
a greater importance and force than they
have in reality. We also pointed out that
the Church in her theory and practice has
maintained this double type of penalty
(medicinal and vindictive), and that this is
more in conformity with what the sources
of revelation and traditional doctrine teach
regarding the coercive power of legitimate
human authority.
It is not a sufficient reply to this assertion to say that the aforementioned sources
contain only thoughts which correspond to
the historic circumstances and to the culture of the time, and that a general and
abiding validity cannot therefore be attributed to them. The reason is that the
words of the sources and of the living
teaching power do not refer to the specific
content of individual juridical prescriptions
or rules of action (cf. particularly Rom.
13:4), but rather to the essential founda-

tion itself of penal power and of its immanent finality. This, in turn, is as little
determined by the conditions of time and
culture as the nature of man and the human society decreed by nature itself. But
whatever the attitude of positive human
law on this problem, it is sufficient for Our
present purpose to make clear that in any
total or partial remission of punishment
the vindictive penalties (no less than the
medicinal) can and even should be taken
into consideration.
Arbitrariness cannot prevail in the application of condonation. The good of the
culprit, no less than that of the juridical
community whose law he has culpably violated, must serve as a norm. Above both
of these are the respect and excellence of
the order established according to what is
good and righteous. This norm requires,
among other things, that, as is the case in
the normal relations of men with one another, so also in the application of penal
power, there be considered not only strict
law and justice, but also equity, goodness
and mercy. Otherwise there is danger that
the "summum ius" be converted into "summa iniuria."
-It is precisely this reflection which gives
rise to the thought that, in medicinal penalties, and also, within certain limits, in
vindictive penalties, a remission of the
punishment should be taken under consideration whenever there is moral certainty that the inherent purpose of the
penalty has been obtained, that is, the true
interior conversion of the guilty person,
and a serious guarantee of its lasting character. The regulations of Canon Law in
this matter (cf. Canon 2248, paragraphs
1 and 2, and Canon 2242, paragraph 3)
might serve as a model. These require, on
the one hand, proof of the actual change
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of mental attitude in the culprit, and, on
the other, do not provide for any automatic
condonation, but rather make it depend on
a positive juridical act of the competent
authority.
In the memorial presented by you, it is
stated that civil penal law on this point
makes a new development and a more
elastic adaptation to modern exigencies appear desirable. This proposal may be good,
although the requirements of civil penal
law under various aspects differ from ecclesiastical penal law. In any event, the
carrying out of any reform seems to require new theoretical clarifications and
well-founded practical experimentation.
Along with the legal and technical aspect of liberation from punishment, the
same memorial also mentions another, completely different, but very real, influence
which is exerted upon the culprit, and
which, being a more profound, intimate
liberation from punishment, cannot be
passed over in silence. Naturally it is less
pleasing to professional jurists as such, although acceptable to them as "men" and
"Christians"; it indicates an essential deepening or, one may prefer to say, a sublimation or "Christianization" of the entire
problem of the execution of penalties.
Punishment is looked upon, by its very
nature, as an evil imposed on man against
his will; hence it creates of itself a spontaneous defensive attitude on the part of
the interior man. He feels himself robbed
of the free disposition of himself and subjected to an extraneous will. Similar evils,
but arising from other sources, frequently
affect man, or he may even choose them
by his own free election. As soon as spontaneous opposition to the suffering no
longer exists, its oppressive and humiliating aspect disappears or is substantially di-
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minished, even though the sensitive and
painful element remains. This We have already had occasion to point out in the
second part of Our present exposition.
Very many people, even though innocent, are today thus oppressed and suffering; they suffer physically and morally in
prisons and penitentiaries, in concentration
camps, in places of forced labor, in mines,
in quarries to which they have been relegated by political passion or the arbitrary
whim of totalitarian powers. They suffer
all the miseries and all the sorrows - and
sometimes even more-that can be inflicted
upon true culprits according to law and
justice. Those who through no fault of their
own suffer such evils are certainly not able
to escape externally the pressure of force,
but they can interiorly rise above all such
things, sustained perhaps by naturally good
moral motives, but much more easily and
effectively by religious considerations, by
the certainty that always and everywhere
they depend on Divine Providence, which
permits no person or thing to be taken
from its grasp, and which -beyond the
fleeting period of man's earthly life - possesses an eternity and an almighty power
to set aright whatever has been unjustly
suffered, to equalize again all things disarranged and hidden, to crush and punish
all human tyranny.
To the eyes of the Christian, there is ever
present Our Lord, Who in His Passion experienced all the depths of human suffering
and tasted all its bitterness, and, in obedience to the Father, for love of Him and out
of loving compassion for men, willingly
took upon Himself sorrow and ignominy,
the cross and death. Strengthened by the
example of the God-man, many of these
innocent victims find in their suffering interior liberty and peace, and attain an interior
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liberation from sorrow, even while the external affliction endures, through the way
of faith, of love and of grace.
Those who suffer through their own fault
and feel themselves slaves of punishment
may also attain the same end and by the
very same way. We would wish to recall
here what We have already said when
speaking of the execution of punishment,
concerning the spiritual circumstances of
the person condemned to prison. Here We
desire to consider how one can and should
assist him to attain an interior victory and
consequently an interior liberation from the
evil of punishment. By faith and love and
grace, clarity of vision and light can be
imparted to his spirit, warmth and substance to his courage, strength and support
to his weakness. Unquestionably the convicted person could himself bring to maturity and completion such an elevation;
few, however, abandoned to their own devices, will be able to do so. They therefore
need from others'advice, assistance, sympathy, encouragement and comfort. But
the one who undertakes such a task must
draw forth from his own convictions and
his own interior riches that which he would
communicate to the prisoner. Otherwise
his words would be only sounding brass
and tinkling cymbals (I Cor. 13, 1).
We have read with profound emotion
what one of your members, the distinguished Professor Francesco Carnelutti, has
written on the words which the Lord will
pronounce at the end of time: "I was in
prison and you visited me .... As long as
you did it for one of these the least of my
brethren, you did it for me" (Matt. 25,
36-40).
What is here proposed as the ideal in the
gift of oneself for the spiritual salvation and
purification of the prisoner goes beyond

the new precept of the Divine Redeemer
"Love one another," which was to be
the evident mark whereby His disciples
would recognize one another (John, 13,
34-35); it is a question, in fact, of approaching the guilty one in such wise as to
see, honor and love him in the Lord, and
even so to liken oneself to him as to put
oneself spiritually in the place of the man
in convict's garb and detained in his prison
cell, as the Lord says of Himself: I was in
prison and you came to me (Matt. 25, 36):
all of this interior world, this light, and this
goodness of Christ can give the condemned
prisoner support and assistance in order to
come forth from the wretched servitude of
punishment and acquire once again liberty
and interior peace.
Furthermore the words of the Lord place
an obligation not only on those who have
the immediate care of the condemned person, but also on the community itself, of
which he is and remains a member. The
community should see to it that it is disposed to welcome lovingly the man who
comes forth from prison into liberty. This
love should not be blind but clear-seeing,
and at the same time sincere, helpful and
discreet, such as to make possible his readaptation to social life and a renewed
consciousness of himself as free from guilt
and punishment. The requirements of such
a disposition are not based upon a utopian
blindness to reality. As has been noted, not
all criminals are ready and inclined to bear
with the required process of purification
- and perhaps the percentage of such is
rather large - but it is still true that many
others can be, and are assisted to obtain
complete interior liberation, and for these
especially no Christian effort will ever be
too much or too difficult.
(Continued on page 125)

